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Prof. Duncan McCargo University of Leeds
Mobilising Voters in Southeast Asia: 
Take Thaksin, Take Thailand
Inspired by the way in which American and European political parties and candidates have appropriated sales and advertising techniques from the private sector, political scientists have recently created a 
new subfield of political marketing studies. This inter-disciplinary area of study has met with some sniffy 
responses from more conservative academics, who prefer to understand election campaigns in terms 
of conventional models that emphasise, for example, voter choices between alternative policies and 
platforms, and the salience of grassroots campaigning by party activists. Students of political marketing, 
by contrast, point to the decline of party memberships and machines, and the growing sense (acutely 
visible in the case of Britain) that in a post-ideological area, distinctions between different parties and 
politicians are often matters of style rather than of substance. 
While electoral studies in developed democracies have been strongly challenged 
by new approaches that depict voters more as consumers than as active political 
citizens, the study of elections in the Asia-Pacific region remain stuck in a time-
warp. Influenced by over-deterministic and teleological readings of democratisation 
theory, most of those who work on these elections in the region are desperately 
seeking evidence of the emergence of ‘real’ political parties, which sport ‘proper’ 
ideologies, and feature complex membership and branch structures, along with 
‘genuine’ policy platforms. In reality, many Asian countries are in the process of 
bypassing the entire apparatus of modern political parties, moving instead directly 
from elections based largely on personalism, patronage and corruption, to elections 
in which these traditional campaign elements are compounded and modified by 
hybridised parties with ‘electoral professional’ elements, using all the latest media 
and marketing techniques.
There are few better examples than Thailand, where political parties have never been 
the same since former premier Thaksin Shinawatra launched his Thai Rak Thai (Thais 
Love Thais) Party in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Capitalising on a popular 
mood of anti-IMF nationalism, Thaksin created a party that captured the zeitgeist, 
foregrounding himself as a catch-all, can-do leader who would bring the energy and 
creativity of the business sector to a country for too long dominated by bureaucrats, 
the military and the palace. Thai Rak Thai did not rely upon traditional notions of 
the political party: mass membership, branches and ideology were of marginal 
importance. At the centre lay a dynamic leader whose decisions and policies were 
shaped by focus groups and marketing teams, and who epitomised the idea of an 
electoral professional party, Southeast Asian style. Thai Rak Thai proceeded to win 
an impressive victory in the 2001 general elections, and successfully complete a full 
four year parliamentary term. After absorbing a couple of coalition partners and 
pulling off a second triumph in the 2005 polls, Thaksin was able to form Thailand’s 
first elected one party administration.
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The downside of Thai Rak Thai was that for all his 
supposed modernity, Thaksin was very reliant on 
the hundreds of old-style politicians whom he had 
brought into the party. Around half of his MPs were 
unreconstructed rural machine politicians, who 
relied upon networks of canvassers to harvest votes 
through personal connections and money politics. 
Thai Rak Thai was a schizophrenic party, adroitly 
bridging the old and the new. There was no real 
inconsistency between the rise of the professional 
politician and the persistence of the local boss. 
Both could live side-by-side in the hybridised politics 
epitomised by Thai Rak Thai, a party with the deeply 
ironic slogan ‘Think new, act new’. 
As Anyarat Chattharakul has shown in her study of 
vote-canvassers during the Thaksin era, parliamentary 
candidates in Thailand use sophisticated mapping 
techniques to classify households and communities 
into sympathetic, neutral and hostile categories, 
deploying a range of diverse election campaigning 
techniques to secure votes. In many traditional 
communities, such as slum areas or those inhabited 
by religious minorities, votes may be readily secured 
through vote-buying and by winning over key 
community leaders with whom strong personal 
connections are cultivated. In more middle class 
gated communities, such tactics would be utterly 
counterproductive; candidates need to find ways 
of accessing these voters to present images of 
themselves as sophisticated, educated and above 
the fray of grubby electioneering. In theory there 
is an enormous difference between the two styles 
electioneering, but Anyarat argues that in many ways 
the two approaches are mirror images of one another. 
Whilst the middle classes tend to look down on 
lower levels of society with a lofty disdain, reproaching 
them for ‘selling’ their votes and behaving in 
immoral ways that reflect their lack of education and 
understanding, members of the Thai middle classes 
are themselves engaged in dubious patronage-based 
deals to secure their own business interests, and to 
gain access to privileged domains – such as ensuring 
that their children can be admitted to elite schools. 
In this respect, Thaksin Shinawatra and his hybridised 
mode of political mobilisation epitomised all the 
contradictions and double standards of early twenty-
first century Thailand, where what purported to 
be new was actually based on longstanding and 
highly questionable social practices. Thailand was an 
interesting example of where older notions of the 
political party based on mass bureaucratic models – 
emphasising mass membership, branches, collective 
decision making and ideology – had never properly 
caught on, despite the persistent belief that only such 
parties would constitute ‘real’ political parties. No 
genuine mass bureaucratic party had ever emerged 
in Thailand, and with the decline of such parties 
worldwide, the likelihood of their ever appearing 
must now be considered extremely remote. 
Instead, Thaksin-style hybridised, pseudo-electoral 
professional parties are now the order of the day. 
While TRT was abolished by the courts in 2007, and 
its successor People Power Party suffered a similar 
fate in 2008, the torch of Thaksinisation is still carried 
by the Puea Thai Party. Meanwhile the Democrat 
Party has adopted a similar leader-centred approach, 
building its image around the youthful, British-
educated premier Abhisit Vejjajiva, and adopting 
policies and communication styles which are highly 
resonant of Thai Rak Thais’s methods, postures 
and language. None of this means that electoral 
professionalism has truly arrived; in many parts of 
the country, vote-canvassing networks and money 
politics continue to rule the ballot box. Thailand’s 
electoral politics remains a mass of contradictions. ■
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